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Abstract: Continuous Deployment (CD) has emerged as a new practice in the software industry to continuously and 
automatically deploy software changes into production. Continuous Deployment Pipeline (CDP) supports CD 
practice by transferring the changes from the repository to production. Since most of the CDP components run 
in an environment that has several interfaces to the Internet, these components are vulnerable to various kinds of 
malicious attacks. This paper reports our work aimed at designing secure CDP by utilizing security tactics. We 
have demonstrated the effectiveness of five security tactics in designing a secure pipeline by conducting an 
experiment on two CDPs– one incorporates security tactics while the other does not. Both CDPs have been 
analysed qualitatively and quantitatively. We used assurance cases with goal-structured notations for qualitative 
analysis. For quantitative analysis, we used penetration tools. Our findings indicate that the applied tactics 
improve the security of the major components (i.e., repository, continuous integration server, main server) of a 
CDP by controlling access to the components and establishing secure connections. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Continuous Deployment (CD) is a software 
development practice which enables an organization 
to deploy software to customers continuously, 
automatically and reliably (Claps et al., 2015, 
ElectricCloud, 2016). A number of innovative 
organizations such as Facebook, Microsoft, and IBM 
adopted CD to deliver values to their customers 
frequently. CD brings several benefits to an 
organization (Anderson, 2014). These benefits 
include reducing developer’s effort, improving the 
quality of software, and reduced cost (Anderson et al., 
2014, Chen, 2015). Continuous Deployment Pipeline 
(CDP) is the core concept to successfully implement 
CD practice (contributors, 2016, Humble and Farley, 
2010, Phillips A, 2015). CDP automatically transfers 
code changes from a repository to a production 
environment.  Furthermore, CDP enables the team 
members to always keep an eye on every aspect (e.g., 
build, deploy, test etc.) of the system, and get a quick 
feedback on deployed software. A CDP also 
promotes collaboration between various groups of 
developers working together to fix bugs and issues 
and deliver the software by improving the visibility 
of changes (Fowler, 2013). A CDP is a collection of 
stages (e.g., build, package, and test) supported by 
tools (GitHub, Jenkins, AWS etc.) and technologies 
for enabling continuous and automated deployment 
of changes into production. The number and nature of 
stages involved in CDP vary from organization to 
organization (Adams and McIntosh, 2016). Similarly, 
the tools and technologies incorporated for 
implementation of CDP also vary from project to 
project and organization to organization. 
Security of software supply chain is 
becoming important because of the involvement of 
several direct and indirect participants in the process 
(Ellison et al., 2010). In order to ensure a secure 
supply of software, each phase (initiation, 
development, deployment, maintenance and disposal) 
of software supply chain needs to be protected from 
malicious attacks. Being the last portion of the supply 
chain, deployment pipeline needs to be fully secure 
(Bass et al., 2015). However, the reality is contrary to 
this. Different users from various teams (e.g., 
development, operation, and testing) have the same 
level of access to various resources on the pipeline 
which gives unnecessary access and paws way for 
malicious activities (Rimba et al., 2015). Continuous 
Integration (CI) server, an important part of a CDP, 
generally has a monolithic design which enables an 
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attacker (who breached a single part of the code) to 
have access to all parts of the code and so gain an 
overall control of the entire process (Bass et al., 
2015). Securing a CDP is a challenging task due to 
the variety of tools involved with each having its own 
security requirements (Bass et al., 2015).  
It is asserted that if the components of a CDP 
and the communication among them are secure, then 
the whole CDP will be secure (Bass et al., 2015, 
Rimba et al., 2015). Hence, we propose the use of five 
security tactics for protecting CDP from malicious 
attacks by addressing the security requirements of the 
three major components (i.e., repository, main server, 
and CI server) of the CDP. The primary focus of our 
security tactics is to ensure controlled access to these 
components. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our 
security tactics by comparing two CDPs – one that 
incorporates our proposed tactics and other that does 
not.  Our results show that security tactics ultimately 
lead to enhancing the security of the entire CDP. It is 
worth mentioning that both academia and industry 
refer to CDP and CI server also as continuous 
delivery pipeline and automated build server 
respectively. Therefore, these terms are used 
interchangeably in the rest of the paper.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: 
Section 2 discusses CDP, its security in the light of 
existing literature, and motivation for this work. 
Section 3 includes an overview of our implemented 
CDPs, security risks identified for each of the three 
components, and presents our approach for 
eliminating identified risks through the incorporation 
of our proposed security tactics. Section 4 presents 
analysis and results from the qualitative and 
quantitative evaluation of the effectiveness of 
security tactics. Section 5 provides a discussion on the 
results and limitations of our approach. Section 6 
concludes the work and identifies some future 
research directions. 
2 RELATED WORK 
Sufficient research exists on the identification and 
categorization of software security risks. Reviewing 
such literature gives us an idea of possible 
permutations inside a software system. (Landwehr et 
al., 1993) classify security flaws based on how, when 
and where they are introduced into the system. Based 
on this logic, security flaws are categorized into three 
categories: Genesis (intentionally, unintentionally 




etc.), Time of Introduction (during development, 
maintenance, or operation etc.) and Location 
(hardware or software). ((Langweg, 2004) categorize 
attacks that software applications can come across. 
According to this classification, attacks are divided 
into three categories: Location (input), Cause 
(processing), and Effect (output).  (Aslam et al., 
1996) present the classification of security faults in 
Unix Operating System to highlight various types of 
security faults. Similarly, several organizations also 
highlight security risks in software. Open Web 
Application Security Project (OWASP)1 created a list 
of top 10 vulnerabilities (e.g. injection, broken 
authentication & session management, and missing 
function-level access control etc.) for web 
applications. In 2011, Common Weaknesses 
Enumeration (CWE)2 also published a list of 25 
software errors (missing authentication, missing 
authorization, incorrect authorization etc.) that can 
lead to serious losses.  
 (Bass et al., 2015) explore various scenarios 
of subverting a pipeline that includes deployment of 
an invalid image, deployment of an image without 
being passed through a complete pipeline, and 
unauthorized environment (e.g. development) having 
direct access to the production environment. Authors 
propose steps for securing the pipeline that includes: 
(1) identification of security requirements of the 
pipeline; (2) differentiating between trustworthy and 
untrustworthy components of the pipeline; (3) 
decomposition of untrustworthy components of the 
pipeline; (4) modification of untrustworthy 
components to let the trustworthy components 
perform critical operations. The proposed process for 
securing the deployment pipeline is aimed at making 
trustworthy components of the pipeline mediate 
access to the actual building and deploying activities. 
Accessing sensitive data or functions only through 
trustworthy components improves the security of the 
pipeline by preventing untrustworthy components 
from accessing sensitive functions. The devised 
process does not fully secure the pipeline but hardens 
it to a certain level. 
 (Rimba et al., 2015) highlight several 
security requirements of CDP that include: (1) 
different roles (e.g. development team, operation 
team etc.) should have different levels of access (2) in 
order to prevent malicious code end up being 
deployed in production, CDP should not be miss-
configured or compromised in any way and (3) 
testing and production environments should be fully 
isolated. Authors demonstrate the suitability of their 
proposed approach (Design Fragments) by securing a 
2 http://cwe.mitre.org/top25/  
  
 
CDP to satisfy its security requirements. In order to 
address first security requirement, authors utilize 
existing security mechanisms of Amazon Web 
Service (AWS) and CI server (Jenkins) to assign 
different access levels to different users. For second 
security requirement, AWS buckets (codeBucket, 
credsBucket, imageBucket, and configBucket) have 
been protected by allowing only Jenkins to have 
access to them. Authentication enforcer design 
fragment has been inserted between Jenkins and 
buckets, and devised tactics are leveraged to make 
required connections or disconnections for separating 
Jenkins from trusted components. Using execution 
domain pattern, authors define three logical execution 
domains (testing, production, and shared) for 
isolation of testing and production environments. 
Assurance Case Analysis has been performed to 
verify that devised tactics fully address second and 
third security requirement of the CDP.  
 (Gruhn et al., 2013) analyse CI from the 
security perspective to identify possible security 
threats. This study relates to our work as it also 
identifies a class of threats related to build server. 
Build Server executes a build job in four steps: (1) 
Version Control System (VCS) checkout (2) Build 
preparations (3) Builder runs (4) Notification. Each 
step is vulnerable to various kinds of malicious 
attacks such as exploiting symbolic links (Ko et al., 
1994), Denial of Service attack, Thompson’s trusting 
trust attack (Thompson, 1984). These threats are 
eliminated by encapsulating build job through 
virtualization. The CI system restores build server to 
its original clean form after every build process and 
thereby, protects build server from malicious attacks.  
This related work section gives us an insight into 
CDP security risks through investigation of security 
taxonomies, findings of various security 
organizations and related research works. From these 
findings, it can be extracted that CDP is subjected to 
a vast majority of security threats. In existing 
literature, some studies (Bass et al., 2015, Rimba et 
al., 2015) focus on access control while some (Gruhn 
et al., 2013) focus on virtualization for securing build 
server. Our approach leverages both access control 
measures and virtualization for securing the pipeline. 
Similarly, existing approaches are primarily focused 
on securing build server (which is one component of 
the CDP) while our proposed tactics secure three 
main components (repository, main server, and build 
server) of the CDP. Most importantly, existing 
approaches are evaluated using only qualitative 
analysis. We evaluate the effectiveness of our 
proposed security tactics using both qualitative and 
quantitative analysis. 
3 APPROACH 
First, this section briefly describes our CDP and 
shows how basic components of our implemented 
CDPs collaborate with each other.  Then, the CDP is 
analysed from the security perspective to identify the 
basic security risks in the CDP. The identification of 
these security risks helps us in designing our security 
tactics. Finally, we describe proposed security tactics 
for improving the security of our CDP. 
 
3.1 Overview of CDP 
The three main components of our CDP and the 
relation between them is shown in Fig – 1. The 
repository is the place where developers commit their 
developed code. CI server is responsible for testing 
and building the code committed to the repository. In 
case commit of a developer breaks the commit of 
another developer, then corresponding developer is 
informed. If the build is successful then the code is 
deployed in the main server. 
 
Figure 1: Continuous Deployment Pipeline (CDP).  
The components of the CDP, tools used for 
implementation of the corresponding components, 
and their versions are shown in Table – 1. For the 
purpose of comparison, two CDPs are implemented – 
one incorporates the security tactics (Secure CDP) 
and other does not (Non-secure CDP). In both CDPs, 
except GitHub, all other components run on an AWS 
instance with Ubuntu as OS.   
 
Table 1: Components of CDP. 
Component Tool Version 
Repository GitHub 1.9.1 
CI Server Jenkins 1.656 
Test JUnit 4.11 
Build Server Maven 2.2.1 
Web Server Tomcat 7.0.52.0 
 
3.2 Security Risks in CDP 
One of the major challenges in implementing CDP is 
dealing with security risks (Bass et al., 2015, Rimba 
et al., 2015). Before devising any approach for 
securing CDPs, it is imperative to first identify and 
understand these security risks faced by various 
  
 
components of the CDP as summarized in Table – 2 
and described in the followings:  
3.2.1 Security Risks in Repository 
Repository (GitHub) of our CDP is a standalone 
component that does not borrow or lend security to 
any other component. Since a password is the 
protection criterion that repository uses to 
authenticate developers, therefore, password 
implementation needs to be of high strength (Gaw 
and Felten, 2006). Secondly, a user with an access to 
the GitHub account has total control over all other 
repositories associated with that account. This total 
control includes deleting individual repositories and 
accepting a push or pull request for others. If such a 
request for a malicious user is accepted, then this user 
may initiate malicious activities and may accept 
requests for other malicious users. 
3.2.2 Security Risks in Main Server 
Access to the Main server (AWS) should be 
authenticated and authorized. Although a high 
strength password solution is a fairly secure option, 
but sometimes average password solutions are 
implemented which gives an opportunity to social 
engineers to breach password and get unauthenticated 
access to resources (Tari et al., 2006). In addition to 
password protection, an additional security measure 
needs to be taken to enhance the authentication 
process for the Main server. Similarly, once 
authenticated, a user gets full access to the instance 
including the OS. A mechanism is required to restrict 
the access to resources on the Main server. 
3.2.3 Security Risks in CI server 
CI server (Jenkins) also faces serious security threats. 
A security failure can cause malicious injection in a 
VM instance (with Jenkins inside it) while it is 
running. It is important to ensure that before starting 
a new build process, CI server should be in a clean 
state (Gruhn et al., 2013). Secondly, the default 
installation of Jenkins gives free access to everyone. 
A mechanism is needed to assign a role to each user 
which specifies the access rights of the user (Sandhu 
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et al., 1996). Such a mechanism would enable the 
administrator to control who can create, modify and 
delete pipelines. 
Table 2: Security Risks in Key Components of CDP. 










Starting build process with 
previously infected state 
Uncontrolled access 
 
3.3 Proposed Security Tactics 
After a thorough analysis of the security threats posed 
to various components of the CDP, five Security 
Tactics (ST) are devised to eliminate identified 
threats and secure the pipeline against malicious 
activities. These security tactics are: 
 
1. Securing repository through controlled 
access to get hold over who can commit to certain 
branches of the repository 
2. Securing connection to the main server 
through use of private key over Secure SHell (SSH)  
3. Using roles on the main server to control 
access via leveraging AWS Identity and Access 
Management (IAM) ecosystem3 
4. Setting up the CI server to start up a Virtual 
Machine (VM) with a clean state by leveraging 
Jenkins VM plug-in (Jenkins, 2013) 
5. Using Jenkins roles plug-in (Jenkins, 2016) 
for assigning roles on the CI server to control who 
can create, modify and delete pipelines 
 
First two tactics are incorporated in both the CDPs 
(Secure CDP and non-secure CDP) while rest of the 
three tactics are only incorporated in the secure CDP 
as shown in Fig – 2. Each of the tactics is further 





Figure 2: Secure & non-secure CDP with incorporated security tactics.
 
3.3.1 Controlled Access to Repository 
The Repository is the starting point of the CDP and if 
its security is breached, then the security of the entire 
CDP becomes vulnerable. GitHub allows developers 
to commit code to the project by adding them to 
“Collaborators”. In order to have control over who 
can commit code or create and delete individual 
repositories, default security gate of GitHub is 
utilized. This enables the administrator or particular 
user with assigned rights to accept or reject a commit 
request. Each time a user makes a push request to 
commit code, the administrator of the repository has 
the authority to accept or reject the request. Applying 
this approach before accepting any commit request 
enables the administrator to ensure that user or his 
activity is not malicious. Sometimes, it may not be 
possible to have the administrator to make an actual 
pull for every commit due to a high number of commit 
requests. However, there exist several solutions to 
address this issue. For example, if the server is 
propriety Git server then Gitolite4 is a possible 
solution.  
3.3.2 Enhanced Authentication Mechanism 
for Main Server 
In addition to username and password, private key 
over SSH (Ellingwood, 2014) is leveraged by the 
Main server to keep AWS instance safe from an 
insecure connection. Username and password give 
access to AWS interface where instances can be 
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manipulated but username and password cannot 
enable a user to connect to an instance. In order to 
connect to an AWS instance, a private key over SSH 
is required. This additional protection through private 
key over SSH enhances authentication process and 
ensures that no malicious user is connected to an 
AWS instance.  
3.3.3 Controlled Access to Main Server 
Having only authentication mechanism means all 
users will have the same kind of access rights, which 
is problematic. In order to allocate particular access 
rights to particular users, the concept of roles is 
introduced. AWS Identity and Access Management 
(IAM) ecosystem can be utilized to enable an 
administrator to control access of users to AWS 
instances and ecosystem and allocate access rights 
based on the particular role of the user. For example, 
the administrator can control which user can change 
the settings of a firewall.  
3.3.4 Clean CI Server VM Image 
Utilizing VM plug-in in Jenkins protects VM from 
outside malicious access (Gruhn et al., 2013). Every 
time a Jenkins is asked to build, it fires up a VM with 
a Jenkins inside it. Since the Jenkins is inside the VM 
that performs the build, therefore, Jenkins instance is 
not vulnerable to malicious activity. When the build 
process gets finished, VM is shut down and the 
Jenkins instance inside this VM is destroyed. Next 
time, when a Jenkins is asked to build, a new VM with 
a new Jenkins instance is created to start the new 
  
 
clean build. Fig – 3 highlights the significance of VM 
plug-in by showing the difference between states of a 
CI server in the presence and absence of VM plug-in. 
  
Figure 3: States of CI server with and without VM plug-in. 
3.3.5 Controlled Access to CI Server 
With Jenkins’ roles plug-in, it is possible to create 
global roles, project roles, slaves’ roles and user roles 
('Role Strategy Plugin. Available at 
https://wiki.jenkins-
ci.org/display/JENKINS/Role+Strategy+Plugin 
[Last Accessed: 24th Oct, 2016],'). Here, we are 
particularly interested to leverage this plug-in for 
enabling the administrator to have a control over the 
activity of a user. Using roles plug-in, administrator 
assigns roles to each user based on his particular role. 
Such an assignment of role would decide access 
rights of the user. For example, an administrator may 
restrict one user from creating, modifying or deleting 
a pipeline but may allow another user to perform 
these tasks.  
4 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
This section analyses the implemented CDPs both 
qualitatively and quantitatively to investigate whether 
the proposed tactics enhance the security of secure 
CDP.  
4.1 Qualitative Analysis of CDPs 
We use Assurance Case with Goal Structuring 
Notation (GSN) for qualitative assessment of the 
effectiveness of proposed security tactics. Assurance 
Case is a qualitative testing technique where evidence 
is organized into an argument to show to a certain 
interested party that a certain claim regarding the 
system holds true (John Goodenough, 2007). In 
Assurance Case technique, a claim about a system is 
established and supported by objective evidence. 
Sometimes safety arguments within safety cases 
communicated via free text are unclear and create 
misunderstanding among various stack holders. It is 
always efficient and easily understandable to present 
assurance case in graphical form rather than textual 
form. For this purpose, GSN (Kelly and Weaver, 
2004) is used to properly communicate arguments in 
an assurance case through graphical notations. In 
GSN, elements are linked together to form a goal 
structure and while supporting arguments, goal 
structure is successively broken down into sub-goals 
until these small goals can be directly supported via 
evidence (Kelly and Weaver, 2004). 
We aim to secure three basic components 
(Repository, Main Server, and CI Server) of a CDP. 
We will analyse whether our proposed security tactics 
meet the security requirements of these three 
components of a CDP. If we demonstrate that the 
proposed tactics properly meet the security 
requirements, then it can be shown our security tactics 
improve a CDP’s security.  
 From the security perspective, the repository 
requires controlled access, which means not all users, 
should have full rights to access every resource or 
perform any operation at the repository. Security 
requirements of the Main server can be broken down 
into two parts: firstly, every user should be properly 
authenticated before allowing him access to the Main 
server; and secondly access to resources or authority 
to perform operations should be authorized. The 
security requirements of the CI Server can also be 
broken down into two parts: firstly CI server should 
be in the clean state before starting a new build 
process; and secondly access to CI server should be 
controlled so that the principle of least privilege 
(Sandhu and Samarati, 1994) can be realized. We 
make an assurance case as shown in Fig – 4 to argue 
that our proposed tactics satisfy the security 
requirements of the CDP. We claim that our CDP is 
secure because three of the major components 
(repository, main server, CI server) of the CDP are 
secure. The repository is secure because access to the 
repository is totally controlled. First, a user is 
authenticated through his credentials (username and 
password). After being authenticated, default security 
gate of GitHub is leveraged which enables the 
administrator to decide about user’s privileges. The 
mechanism allows the administrator to keep a check 
on who is committing code and prevents a common 
user from allowing an attacker to commit his 
malicious code. This security measure also provides 
  
 
an additional protection to Java files, JUnit files, and 
Maven files because they do not have their own 
security mechanism rather rely on repository's 
security mechanism. Next, we claim that Main Server 
is secure. Main Server will be secure if users 
accessing the Main Server are authenticated and each 
user has specific rights according to his role to access 
or perform particular operations. In order to access an 
AWS instance on Main Server, in addition to 
username and password, a user needs private-key 
over SSH. This additional security measure ensures 
that even if a malicious user breaches the normal 
password security system, he can't connect to the 
AWS instance as he would require a private key for 
connecting and manipulating an AWS instance. 
Similarly, the second requirement of the Main server 
is addressed by utilizing the AWS IAM service that 
enables an administrator to assign specific access 
rights to users according to their roles.  Finally, we 
claim that CI server is also secure. This claim is 
supported by two arguments. In order to ensure that 
CI server is in a clean state before starting a build 
process, we are leveraging the VM plug-in, which 
protects Jenkins instance from malicious attacks and 
ensures that CI server remains in the clean and non-
infected state. Since the security of CI server requires 
controlled access to CI server, role plug-in is 
leveraged to enable an administrator to assign roles to 
various users according to their particular roles.   
Since our qualitative analysis demonstrates 
that the proposed security tactics satisfy the security 
requirements of the CDP, therefore, we can establish 
that our proposed security tactics contribute to 
improving the security of the CDP. 
 
Figure 4: CDP Assurance Case. 
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4.2 Quantitative Analysis of CDPs 
For quantitative evaluation of the effectiveness of 
security tactics, two scanning tests are performed. 
These scanning tests launch various kinds of attacks 
on the application to find vulnerabilities and assess 
the security level of the application.  
The first of these tests is the Qualys OWASP 
Scan5 that is normally practiced to see whether a web 
application works according to the security standards 
set by OWASP against online attackers. Qualys 
OWASP scan helps understand and identify 
vulnerabilities and support in fixing these 
vulnerabilities.  Scanning engine is intelligently 
designed to perform specific scanning tasks and avoid 
unnecessary vulnerability checks. Qualys scanning 
methodology follows the same steps as an attacker 
would follow (Qualys, 2015). The basic steps of the 
scanning process include: (1) checking if the host to 
be scanned is alive and running; (2) checking if host 
is using some firewalling; (3) identifying all open 
TCP and UPD ports; (4) checking which operating 
system is used by host; (5) identification of services 
running on open TCP or UDP ports; (6) starting actual 
non-intrusive vulnerability assessment (Qualys, 
2015).  
The second scanning tool is OWASP Zed 
Attack Proxy (ZAP)6 scanner that is a free security 
scanner for finding vulnerabilities in web 
applications. ZAP has two kinds of scanners: Active 
and Passive (ZAP, 2015). Active scanner performs a 
wide range of known attacks on the host to find 
vulnerabilities. The active scanner cannot detect 
logical vulnerabilities such as broken access control. 
In addition to active scanning, it is always beneficial 
to perform manual penetration testing too. Passive 
scanner constantly examines requests and responses 
to detect a certain type of vulnerabilities. ZAP also 
has fuzzing capability to identify vulnerabilities that 
are more settled, which active and passive scanners 
cannot identify. In this work, we only focus on 
automatic attacks to assess the security aspects of 
CDPs.  
Primarily, these tools focus on web aspect of 
penetration testing. The two important components of 
CDPs (GitHub and Jenkins) have a public interface in 
the form of a website. Tomcat, which hosts Jenkins, 
has a public interface and so does the dashboard that 
controls AWS instances. Keeping in view that CDP 
has public web interfaces, these tools are best 
available tools for quantitative assessment of the 





4.2.1 Repository (GitHub) 
We mentioned that a single repository is used with 
both the CDPs, hence, the security level of the 
repository cannot be compared. Instead, these tests 
enable us to find the vulnerabilities and their severity.  
OWASP scan found 105 vulnerabilities in the 
repository as shown in Fig – 5a. The majority of the 
vulnerabilities are related to Denial-Of-Service (DoS) 
attacks, Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) 
timestamp, path, and password-completion. DoS 
attacks do not pose any direct threat to the security of 
GitHub as these issues can affect communication to 
and from pipeline but cannot directly infect the 
pipeline. As a matter of the best practice, ICMP 
timestamp issues can be addressed via several 
available techniques (Singh et al., 2003, Security, 
2016), but these issues do not have any significance 
in relevance to a CDP’s security. There are several 
path-based vulnerabilities as well which again does 
not pose any serious threat to a CDP’s security. These 
path-based vulnerabilities give the attacker some 
information about folder structure on the server, 
which can be used for guessing the structure of other 
folders on a server. Most browsers have auto-
password completion feature, which is a serious issue. 
It means that retrieving such a password from the 
browser would enable an attacker to access CDP and 
inject malicious software, which will be a total breach 
of security. 
 
Figure 5a: OWASP Scan Result for Repository (GitHub).  
 
ZAP scan found several vulnerabilities 
categorized into eight groups as shown in Fig – 5b. 
Identified vulnerabilities are related to settings of 
cookie, usage of JavaScript, content caching, IP 
disclosure and password auto-completion. Setting 
cookie without the secure flag and HTTPOnly flag 
makes it possible to access cookie via non-encrypted 
connection and using JavaScript respectively. It does 
not have much to do with a CDP’s security and can 
be easily fixed too. The results show that about 6618 
vulnerabilities of using JavaScript for another 
domain. Not all the cases have been checked but the 
ones that are checked come from GitHub subdomain 
asssets-cdn.github.com which makes it a non-issue in 
relevance to a CDP’s security. There are around 3683 
cases (vulnerabilities) where HTTP allows browser or 
proxy to cache contents, which again is not relevant 
to the security of CDP. There are also cases of 
displaying private IP in HTML response code that can 
be mitigated via Load Master Content Rule (KEMP, 
2016) or similar strategies depending upon the type 
of server. This vulnerability is also not directly related 
to the security of CDP. Like OWASP scan, password 
auto-completion vulnerability is detected by ZAP 
scan too, which poses a serious threat to the security 
of CDP.  
 
 
Figure 5b: ZAP Scan Result for Repository (GitHub).  
4.2.2 Main Server (AWS) 
Scanning tests are separately applied on Main servers 
for secure and non-secure CDPs.   
Main Server of Secure CDP 
As shown in Fig – 6a OWASP scan found three 
vulnerabilities in the Main server of secure CDP. 
Vulnerabilities found by this scan are related to 
cookies, which identifies that secure flag and 
HTTPOnly flag are not set. If these flags are not set, 
it may allow the browser to communicate via a non-
encrypted channel and a client side script would be 
able to read a cookie. Hence, such vulnerabilities do 
not affect the security of CDP. Additionally, these 
issues can be easily fixed.  
 
 
Figure 6a: OWASP Scan Result for Main Server (AWS) 
of Secure CDP. 
 
ZAP scan found around 26 vulnerabilities of six 
different types. Results obtained from ZAP scan are 
shown in Fig – 6b. Similar to OWASP scan, the 
majority of vulnerabilities are relevant to cookies. 
Apart from that, issues relevant to content caching 
and cross-site scripting are also identified. The list of 
vulnerabilities shows that X-Frame-Options Header 
is not added. This allows an attacker to inject multiple 
transparent layers in HTTP page for deceiving a user. 
Most modern browsers have this feature and this issue 
can be easily fixed. As mentioned previously, the 
issue of content caching is hardly relevant to the 
  
 
security of CDP. Similarly, the Anti-MIME-Sniffing 
header X-Content-Type-Options can be easily set to 
‘nonsniff’.  Further results indicate that XSS 
protection is not enabled which can be enabled by 
setting the X-XSS-protection HTTP response header 
to ‘1’. 
 
Figure 6b: ZAP Scan Result for Main Server (AWS) of 
Secure CDP. 
Main Server of Non-Secure CDP 
OWASP scan identified three vulnerabilities in the 
Main Server of non-secure CDP as shown in Fig – 7a. 
Identified vulnerabilities are related to password 
auto-completion, which poses a serious threat to the 
security of CDP. 
 
 
Figure 7a: OWASP Scan Result for Main Server (AWS) 
of Non-secure CDP. 
ZAP scan found around 42 vulnerabilities of eight 
types in the Main Server of non-secure CDP as shown 
in Fig – 7b. Most of the vulnerabilities identified are 
of the same kind as found for Main Server of secure 
CDP, however, the number of vulnerabilities 
increased for non-secure CDP. Additionally, as 
shown by OWASP scan as well, Main Server of non-
secure CDP has password auto-completion 
vulnerability that is a serious issue in relevance to the 
security of CDP. 
 
Figure 7b: ZAP Scan Result for Main Server (AWS) of 
Non-secure CDP. 
4.2.3 CI Server (Jenkins) 
Similar to Main Server, scanning tests are applied on 
CI servers of both CDPs. 
CI Server of Secure CDP 
OWASP scan did not find any vulnerability in CI 
server of secure CDP as shown in Fig – 8a. 
 
 
Figure 8a: OWASP Scan Result for CI Server (Jenkins) of 
Secure CDP. 
As shown in Fig – 8b, ZAP scan found around 113 
vulnerabilities of five types. The majority of the 
vulnerabilities are the same as found for the main 
server and it has already been discussed how these 
issues can be addressed. A single serious 
vulnerability is found which relates to password auto-
completion.  
 
Figure 8b: ZAP Scan Result for CI Server (Jenkins) of 
Secure CDP. 
CI Server of Non-Secure CDP 
In CI server of non-secure CDP, OWASP scan could 
not find any vulnerability as shown in Fig – 9a. 
 
 
Figure 9a: OWASP Scan Result for CI Server (Jenkins) of 
Non-secure CDP. 
 
Figure 9b: ZAP Scan Result for CI Server (Jenkins) of 
Non-secure CDP. 
 
Unlike OWASP scan, ZAP scan found around 
1428 vulnerabilities of seven types in CI server of 
non-secure CDP that is quite a huge number as 
compared to 113 found for secure CDP (see Fig – 9b). 
In addition to the vulnerabilities found in CI server of 
secure CDP, zap found several other serious 























3            3 26 42 29 45 
CI Server          0            0 113 1428 113 1428 
GitHub                 105              10781 10886 
These newly identified vulnerabilities are 
related to path traversal and application error 
disclosure. The path traversal vulnerability is serious 
because it allows an attacker to trick the web server 
and get unauthorized access to sensitive files. 
Application error disclosure may disclose sensitive 
information, which can be used to initiate further 
malicious attacks. Apart from these serious issues, 
contrary to a single vulnerability of password auto-
completion in CI server of secure CDP, ZAP scan 
found around 129 such vulnerabilities in CI server of 
non-secure CDP.  
5 DISCUSSION 
As demonstrated, the proposed security tactics are 
implemented in secure CDP and evaluated, both 
qualitatively and quantitatively, to find about its 
effects. The qualitative analysis genuinely specifies 
that secure CDP is more secure than non-secure CDP 
because the access to the repository, main server, and 
CI server is protected through enhanced 
authentication and authorization techniques. The 
quantitative findings show that there are 
vulnerabilities in both the secure CDP and non-secure 
CDP. Since password auto-completion option exists 
in web browsers, therefore, the password can be 
retrieved for both GitHub and Jenkins, which is a 
serious security issue. However, non-secure CDP 
contains serious security risks related to accessing 
cookies through JavaScript, updating Open SSH and 
showing local IP publicly at GitHub.  The findings of 
the two security scans are summarized in Table – 3. 
OWASP scan does not show any difference in the 
number of vulnerabilities but the nature of 
vulnerabilities found for secure and non-secure CDP 
is different. Vulnerabilities found by OWASP scan 
both for Main Server and CI Server are of serious 
nature and pose a direct threat to the security of CDP 
while those found for secure CDP are not so serious 
and are easily fixable. The results shown by ZAP test 
approves the effectiveness of our devised tactics both 
qualitatively and quantitatively. First, the number of 
vulnerabilities found in non-secure CDP is greater 
than the secure CDP has. Secondly, after 
investigation, we found that vulnerabilities identified 
in non-secure CDP are more severe and pose a serious 
threat to the security of CDP.  From the overall results 
of the two security scans, it can be established that 
secure CDP is far less vulnerable to malicious attacks 
as compared to non-secure CDP and so our proposed 
security tactics sufficiently improve the security of 
our CDP.  
 
The question can be raised whether these five 
security tactics affect each other (particularly in a 
negative way). An analysis of these tactics in relation 
to each other would give us a clear picture. The 
repository (GitHub) is isolated from the rest of the 
setup, so the control over commit and access rights do 
not have any consequences in relation to other four 
security tactics. The connection to the main server 
(AWS) through private-key over SSH does not have 
any negative effects on other security tactics rather it 
empowers the security of other components.  
Similarly, roles on the main server do not affect any 
other security tactic, though, it interferes with private-
key over SSH but these two operate in different 
realms. The last two tactics are solely related to 
Jenkins and they do not have any negative 
consequences in relation to the effectiveness of other 
security tactics. From this analysis, it can be 
concluded that devised security tactics can work 
together and do not affect each other in any negative 
way. Here, it is important to mention that our 
evaluation techniques have certain limitations. 
Assurance case is merely a framework for structuring 
argumentation, which is supported by claims and 
quantitative evidence. A deficiency in this technique 
is that it requires an iterative and opponent-based 
  
 
process to develop an adequate analysis. The results 
get fully credible only when they can convince our 
audiences that software is equipped with a reasonable 
level of security. From the security findings and 
general information about the scanning tools, it can 
be deducted that these tools do not cover security 
issues relevant to OS and low-level Java and it is 
highly recommendable to identify and address such 
issues in order to properly assess the security of CDP. 
It is also worth mentioning that for leveraging full 
benefits of the devised security tactics, all other 
essential security measures should be taken into 
account. For example, firewall setting needs to be 
correctly setup to help CDP properly utilize 
incorporated security tactics. 
6 CONCLUSION 
Keeping in view the vast amount of security threats 
faced by CDP, it is critical to analyse the CDP’s 
security for identifying gaps and devising security 
strategies to help secure CDP. In this paper, five 
security tactics are devised to enhance the security of 
three major components (repository, main server and 
CI server) of the CDP, which are: (1) controlled 
access and commit rights for repository; (2) 
controlled access to AWS instance using private-key 
over SSH; (3) use of roles on the main server via 
leveraging AWS IAM; (4) use of VM plug-in for 
ensuring initial clear state of Jenkins; (5) use of roles 
on CI server to control access to Jenkins. After 
devising these security tactics, two CDPs are 
implemented, secure CDP that incorporates proposed 
security tactics and non-secure CDP that does not 
incorporate three of the proposed security tactics.  
The security of both CDPs is evaluated through 
qualitative and quantitative methods. The qualitative 
analysis shows that secure CDP implemented with 
security tactics is more secure than non-secure CDP. 
The quantitative analysis also shows a significant 
improvement in the security level of secure CDP as 
evident from the number and nature of vulnerabilities 
found in both CDPs through two different scanning 
tests.  
The results obtained through quantitative 
analysis showed some deviation from expected 
results, which is due to the fact that these penetration 
tools are specialized for assessing the security of web 
application. In next step, we plan to develop a 
framework for assessing the security of the CDPs. We 
also plan to incorporate our proposed security tactics 
                                                          
7 http://www.blackwasp.co.uk/gofpatterns.aspx  
in a real CDP project and assess their effects on the 
security aspect of the CDP.  In future research, these 
five security tactics will be transformed into five 
security patterns by formally describing them 
according to the standards set by Gang of Four (GoF)7 
team. 
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